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2010 PROXY ACCESS PROPOSALS: A POISON PILL FOR
CORPORATE HEALTH
STEPHEN W. KIEFER∗
ABSTRACT
The SEC has proposed proxy access rules in the wake of the recent
financial crisis. With the stated purpose of removing impediments to the
exercise of shareholder voice and increasing director accountability, the
proposed rule changes are not without problems. The proposed rules enter
a mix in which the corporate governance landscape, shaped by powerful
role players, already presents troubling possibilities for activist
shareholder abuse. This Article argues that adoption of the proposed rules
could be the final piece to a puzzle in which shareholder power is
achieved at the expense of long-term corporate health and shareholder
value.
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INTRODUCTION
In June of 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
proposed changes to the federal proxy rules.1 Specifically, by proposing a
new rule in Rule 14a-11 and an amendment to Rule 14a-8,2 the SEC took
steps towards giving shareholders a greater voice in corporate
governance.3 This contentious topic, raised in the wake of a serious
economic crisis, has engendered lively debate from scholars, practitioners,
and interest groups on both sides of the issue.4
According to the SEC, the economic crisis has raised “serious
concerns about the accountability and responsiveness of some companies
and boards of directors to the interests of shareholders, and has resulted in
a loss of investor confidence.”5 As a result, the SEC proposed these rule
changes to remove impediments to “the ability of shareholders to hold
boards accountable through the exercise of their fundamental right to
nominate and elect members to company boards of directors.”6
The means by which proxy access is presumed to enhance director
accountability is by enabling shareholders to assume a greater role in
director elections.7 It does so by removing the cost that would otherwise
be incurred by a shareholder preparing his or her own expensive proxy
materials featuring candidates of his or her choosing.8 Enabling
shareholders to nominate directors inexpensively would thus enhance
director accountability by providing a real threat that an incumbent
director may be removed from the board.
Although praised by some, these changes give others unease.9 It is
appropriate, therefore, to revisit the current landscape of corporate
1

See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,024
(Jun. 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
2
Proposed Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8 are not the only proposed rule changes in the
SEC’s effort to facilitate shareholder access in board elections; however, they are the two
most relevant to the scope of this paper. See id. (describing other rules regarding
shareholder access in board elections).
3
See id. (proposing changes to “remove impediments to the exercise of shareholders’
rights to … elect … boards of directors”).
4
This is evidenced by the fact that the SEC saw fit to re-open the comment period in
early 2010. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 67,144,
67,144 (Dec. 18, 2009) (comments were due on January 19, 2010).
5
Id. at 29,025.
6
Id.
7
See Lisa M. Fairfax, Delaware’s New Proxy Access: Much Ado About Nothing?, 11
TENN. J. BUS. L. 87, 91 (2009).
8
Id. at 91-92.
9
See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against
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governance in America. This Article argues that upon close examination
of corporate governance provisions already in place at many public
corporations, current SEC rules, the role played by proxy advisory firms,
and the composition of the shareholder group and its members’ behavior,
it becomes clear that the proposed rules are, at worst, threatening to longterm corporate health and, at best, unwise.
Part I explains what the SEC’s proposed Rules provide and why they
are perceived, by some, as necessary. Part II examines the current
corporate governance landscape, including the major role players and
prevalent corporate governance provisions. Part III discusses why giving
greater power and a louder voice to shareholders in a climate in which
opportunities for abuse already exist is threatening to the long-term health
of corporations.
I. PROPOSED SEC RULES FOR FACILITATING SHAREHOLDER DIRECTOR
NOMINATIONS
A. Provisions in the Proposed Rules
Proposed new Rule 14a-11 would, if adopted, “require companies to
include disclosure about shareholder nominees for director in company
proxy materials” under certain circumstances.10 The certain circumstances
to which the proposed Rule refers act as a limitation; Rule 14a-11 would
allow a shareholder or shareholder group to avail itself of the Rule only if
the shareholder beneficially owns a specified percentage of the registrant’s
outstanding stock and has owned the stock for at least one year.11 In
explaining the necessity for the new Rule, the SEC noted that because
public corporations have dispersed ownership, “director elections are
largely conducted by proxy rather than in person and, as a result,
impediments that the Federal proxy rules create to shareholders
nominating directors through the proxy process translate into the inability

Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 653 (2010) (arguing that the
“financial crisis exposes major weakness in the shareholder empowerment case”).
10
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,032.
11
Id. at 29,035. The requirement pertaining to amount of shares owned varies
depending on the size of the company, measured in assets. Id. For example, nominating
shareholders need only own 1 percent of a company with net assets of $700 million or
more. Id. Alternatively, for companies with net assets of $75 million or more, the
nominating shareholder(s) must own 3 percent of the company’s stock. Id.
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of shareholders to effectively exercise their rights to nominate and to elect
those directors.”12
In addition to new Rule 14a-11, the SEC has also proposed an
amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8), which would
preclude companies from relying on [provisions in current] Rule
14a-8(i)(8) to exclude from their proxy materials shareholder
proposals by qualifying shareholders that would amend, or that
request an amendment to, a company’s governing documents
regarding nomination procedures or disclosures related to
shareholder nominations, provided the proposal does not conflict
13
with proposed Rule 14a-11.

Under the text of the proposed amendment, proposals may only be
excluded as relating to director elections if the proposal “[w]ould
disqualify a nominee who is standing for election; [w]ould remove a
director from office before his or her term expired; [or] [q]uestions the
competence, business judgment, or character of one or more nominees or
directors ….”14 Again, the justification for this amendment appears to be
that the “election exclusion” relied upon in current Rule 14-8 has operated
as an impediment to the exercise of shareholder voice.
B. Why These Changes? Why Now?
As mentioned above,15 accountability is a central theme underlying the
current attempts at reform. In the shareholder proponent camp, Professor
Lucian Bebchuk maintains that “[s]hareholder power to remove directors
is supposed to provide a mechanism for ensuring that directors are well
chosen and have incentives to serve shareholder interests once chosen.”16
Arguing that impediments under the current system preclude the exercise
of this important shareholder power, Bebchuk claims that adopting the
proposed rules would “improve director accountability.”17 In contrast,
12

Id. at 29,031.
Id.
14
Id. at 29,058 (internal citations omitted).
15
See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
16
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L.
REV. 675, 677 (2007)[hereinafter, Bebchuk, Myth of the Shareholder Franchise].
17
Letter from Lucian A. Bebchuk, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School to
Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commision (Aug. 17, 2009)
(Comment Letter of a Bi-Partisan Group of Eighty Professors of Law, Business,
Economics, or Finance in Favor of Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-60089).
13
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proponents of maintaining the status quo argue that adopting the proposed
rules would create “[a] shareholder-based agency model of the corporation
[that] sends ... a simple instruction: in all circumstances, manage to
maximize the market price of the stock.”18
This has proved to be a divisive issue, as the proposed rules would
increase shareholder voice, at least to the extent of creating an in terrorem
effect in the boardroom.19 Therefore, it is imperative to re-examine the
current landscape of corporate governance in order to ascertain whether
these rules are beneficial, or, on the other hand, menacing for corporate
health and inimical to long-term shareholder value.
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY
A. Prevalent Provisions at Public Companies
1. Majority Voting

Under Delaware law,20 elections to the board of directors are decided
by a plurality of the vote, that is, the director(s) receiving the most votes
are elected.21 However, this provision may be altered by way of a bylaw
amendment adopted by the shareholders, which may “specif[y] the votes
that shall be necessary for the election of directors.”22 When such an
amendment is passed, the standard is typically set at a majority threshold,
meaning that a director must receive a majority of the votes cast in order
to be elected.23 As Claudia Allen notes, majority voting “has become the
18

Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 658-59.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 878 (2005) (“Introducing the power to intervene would induce management
to act differently in order to avoid shareholder intervention.”) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter, Bebchuk, Case for Increasing Shareholder Power].
20
Although provisions may vary by state, for simplicity’s sake, the widespread
incorporation of companies in Delaware encourages analysis of Delaware law. See Faith
Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 59 (2009) (stating that “the consensus among
scholars, commentators, and practicing lawyers” is that “Delaware has won” as the most
important state for corporate law issues).
21
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. viii, § 216(3) (2010) (“Directors shall be elected by a
plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented by proxy at the
meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors.”).
22
Id.
23
See Claudia H. Allen, Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections, Nov. 12,
2007, at 1, available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudy111207.pdf
(last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
19
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prevailing election standard among large public companies.”24 Indeed, the
Allen study indicates that “66% of the companies in the S&P 500 and over
57% of the companies in the Fortune 500 have adopted a form of majority
voting.”25 Allen also states that this practice is not limited to large
companies, but that “majority voting has been adopted by mid-cap, smallcap and some micro-cap companies.”26
This shift in the conduct of director elections begs the question
whether majority voting is beneficial or harmful to shareholder interests
and value. David Porter, a former partner of a prominent law firm, regards
majority voting “as a concept of good governance and shareholder
democracy.”27 Nonetheless, Porter fears an in terrorem effect in which
directors must concern themselves with placating shareholders in order to
be re-elected each year.28 Porter states that such fears could well lead to
directors focusing on short-term strategies.29 Calling upon his
“experiences in practice,” Porter instructs that “an undue focus on shortterm strategies will usually result in poor strategies and outcome for the
long-term.”30
Is the adoption of majority voting, by itself, reason for incumbent
boards to be concerned? Probably not. A director failing to receive a
majority vote in an uncontested election would be a rare occurrence.31
However, when considered in conjunction with other corporate
governance provisions, a threatening mix is brewed. Porter, who believes
that majority voting is a matter of good corporate governance,
nevertheless predicted that majority voting could become much more
threatening to incumbent directors if broker discretionary voting rules
were to change.32 The broker discretionary voting rules have since been
amended. To explain the resulting situation, a discussion of this factor, and
its relation to majority voting, follows.

24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
David P. Porter, Institutional Investors and Their Role in Corporate Governance:
Reflections by a “Recovering” Corporate Governance Lawyer, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
627, 627, 666 (2009) (Porter was a partner at Jones Day in Cleveland, Ohio).
28
Id. at 666.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 663 (“[E]very director in the history of virtually every corporation in
America has always received enough votes to be elected under the majority voting
standard.”).
32
Id. at 663-64.
25
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2. Amendment to Broker Discretionary Voting Rules

In July of 2009, the SEC approved a rule change proposed by the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that “eliminate[d] broker discretionary
voting for the election of directors” because elections of directors would
no longer be considered a “routine” matter for which instructions from the
beneficial owners of stock are not required.33 Prior to the rule change,
brokers were permitted to vote without receiving “voting instructions from
the beneficial owner on uncontested elections of directors.”34 Under the
new regime, brokers may not vote without receiving instructions from the
beneficial owner for any director election, whether uncontested or
contested.35
The result is clear: if one accepts the premise that many retail
investors—individuals and not institutional investors—will not give
voting instructions to their brokers, fewer votes will be cast for incumbent
directors.36 This may present problems in both contested and uncontested
director elections.
It may appear surprising that a director could lose an election when
running unopposed. However, a 2004 director election for the Walt Disney
Company is illustrative. In that election, had broker votes “not been
counted, then CEO and board chair Michael Eisner would have received
only 45 percent of the votes in favor of his reelection ....”37 When coupled
with the majority voting provision in place at many corporations, this
example makes clear that these two factors, working in tandem, could
result in a director losing in an uncontested election.
With respect to contested elections, the possibilities are more troubling
for incumbent directors. When a shareholder, or a group thereof,
nominates a dissident slate of directors to be elected, their chances of
success are greatly increased because, as mentioned above, retail investor
33

Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange LLC; Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 4, To Amend NYSE Rule 452
and Corresponding Listed Company Manual Section 402.08 To Eliminate Broker
Discretionary Voting for the Election of Directors, Except for Companies Registered
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, and To Codify Two Previously Published
Interpretations That Do Not Permit Broker Discretionary Voting for Material
Amendments to Investment Advisory Contracts With an Investment Company, 74 Fed.
Reg. 33,293, 33,293-94 (July 10, 2009).
34
Id. at 33,293.
35
Id.
36
Fairfax, supra note 7, at 99 (“Brokers’ voting overwhelmingly follows the
recommendation of incumbent boards.”).
37
Id.
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votes—which hitherto would have often been voted by brokers in favor of
incumbents—may not be available for incumbent directors. This problem
would only be exacerbated by facilitating shareholder director
nominations under SEC proposed Rule 14a-11. As corporate lawyer Laura
Richman points out, “[i]f the SEC adopts [Rule 14a-11] … the impact of
lowered retail vote returns may be coupled with a large shareholder or
shareholder group supporting its own nominee.”38 The result is clear:
incumbent directors may lose, and retail investors will witness a change in
the composition of those managing their investment, all without having
voiced their approval or opposition.
B. The Role Players
1. Activist Institutional Investors
Institutional investors now comprise a majority of all shareholders in
publicly-traded companies.39 However, activism among institutional
shareholders is typically identified with hedge funds. This is so because
hedge funds have more of an incentive to participate actively than do
mutual funds.40 Hedge fund managers are paid a fee based on fund
performance,41 whereas managers of other institutional investors, such as
mutual funds, are prohibited by statute from receiving incentive-based
pay.42 Thus, hedge funds engage “in active corporate monitoring because
the structure of their compensation provides their managers with a direct
financial incentive to do so.”43
Scholars and practitioners alike debate with great force whether hedge
funds’ active monitoring is beneficial or detrimental to shareholders
generally. Those with a hostile view of hedge funds describe them as
follows:

38

Laura D. Richman, Amendment of NYSE Rule 452: Elimination of Broker
Discretionary Voting in Director Elections (July 1, 2009), http://www.mayerbrown.com/
publications/article.asp?id=7172.
39
John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions:
Why “Exit” Works Better Than “Voice”, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 416-17 (2008).
40
Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap
for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 225, 231 (2007).
41
Id. at 231.
42
Id. at 318 (explaining that “§205(a)(1) of the Investment Advisors Act prohibits”
mutual fund “managers from receiving compensation” based on “capital gains … of the
funds”).
43
Id. at 231.
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These are impatient shareholders, who look for value and want it
realized in the near or immediate term. Their strategy is to tell
managers how to realize that value and to challenge publicly those
who resist their advice, using the proxy contest as a threat ….
[They] act out a game of threat and resistance in which victory lies
in either the insurgent’s entry into the boardroom on a minority
basis or the target’s diffusion of the threat with a governance
44
concession.

Commentators with the opposing view champion hedge funds for
“actively direct[ing] corporate policy” and "resolv[ing] corporate law’s
fundamental agency problem by reuniting ownership and control.”45
While the utility of hedge fund activism may be debated, its power
may not. An illuminating example may be found with regard to hedge
fund activity in the boardroom at Deutsche Borse. The Deutsche Borse
board, persuaded by the company’s CEO, had determined to acquire the
London Stock Exchange; however, a hedge fund holding a 5 percent
interest in Deutsche Borse, The Children’s Investment Fund Management
(TCI), opposed the move.46 TCI opposed the move because it felt that the
funds necessary to acquire the London Stock Exchange would be better
spent in a stock repurchase.47 After TCI put a plan in motion to have
Deutsche Borse’s chairman replaced, the company abandoned its bid for
the London Stock Exchange and committed itself to distributing cash to
the shareholders.48 This example makes plain the undeniable power hedge
funds wield.
The Deutsche Borse example also sheds light on the concern raised
most often by those who view hedge funds in a negative light, namely that
hedge funds have a short-term outlook, and thus their interests are
misaligned with those of shareholders generally. Hedge funds are
considered, by some, to have a short-term focus because they look for an
increase in value in the short-term, and they tend to hold stock for less
time than do retail investors.49 This asymmetry between hedge fund
interests and the interests of those with a longer-term outlook may lead to
44

William W. Bratton, Private Equity’s Three Lessons for Agency Theory, 3 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 11 (2008).
45
Illig, supra note 40, at 228-29.
46
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1035 (2007).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 1035-36.
49
See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 46,
at 1083 (“For some funds, holding shares for a full day represents a ‘long-term’
investment.”).
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situations in which short-term capital gains for hedge funds are large, but
shareholder value generally will be decreased.
TCI’s intervention at Deutsche Borse illustrates how the misalignment
of interests could harm long-term value. Without considering the actual
merits of Deutsche Borse’s proposed bid for the London Stock Exchange,
assume that the acquisition would have proved to be a wise investment
and provided shareholders with valuable returns in the long-term. Kahan
and Rock noted that TCI’s intervention would “have had the effect of
pushing the company toward the lower value outcome: an outcome worse
for long-term shareholders than acquiring the LSE.”50
Illuminating as the Deutsche Borse example is, it merely reaffirms the
original proposition that hedge funds actively monitor board and
management decisions. From this point some may argue that hedge fund
activism creates value by preventing unwise board decisions, while others
may point to examples in which valuable long-term investments were
foregone. Whichever side of the story one believes, the ability of hedge
funds to intervene in the boardroom is an undeniable fact.
2. Proxy Advisory Firms
Proxy advisory services such as RiskMetrics Group, Inc., Glass Lewis
& Co., and Proxy Governance Inc.51 use “ratings to formulate voting
recommendations and other governance-rating providers … to advise on
investment decisions.”52 These firms create a rating index based on what
they consider to be best practices for corporate governance.53 The firms
then rate a corporation based on how the company’s corporate governance
provisions compare to the firm’s ratings index.54 Their power is great, and
as a result, they have brought change to corporate governance—change
that is harmful to long-term shareholder value.
One example of this power can be found with regard to staggered
boards. Marc Goldstein, the head of research engagements for
RiskMetrics’s Governance Services unit and a member of the firm’s
policy board, wrote an article in which he proclaimed that RiskMetrics
50

Kahan & Rock, supra note 46, at 1084.
As RiskMetrics is the industry leader, repeated reference to that firm will be made
when referring to proxy advisory services generally. See Porter, supra note 27, at 667
(RiskMetrics is “the most prominent of the proxy advisory services firms.”).
52
Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of
Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1807 (2008).
53
Id.
54
Id.
51
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advises shareholders to “make certain that the board they empanel will not
be excessively deferential [to management] by … [i]mproving board
accountability through the elimination of staggered board elections ….”55
However, the wisdom of this approach for long-term corporate health is
questionable. A seasoned corporate attorney declares that “the long-term
view is more obviously protected by classified boards ... which
emphasizes a longer time horizon ….”56 Nevertheless, a survey of
companies to whom proposals to eliminate staggered boards were
presented in 2006 revealed that forty-five of forty-six supported the
change.57 While it may be difficult to ascertain how many of those
companies’ boards were acceding to pressure from a RiskMetrics’s
advisory opinion, it is fair to presume that RiskMetrics played a role in
many of the votes.58
The influence of RiskMetrics is unmistakable.59 However, its influence
may be most startling with respect to director elections. Institutional
investors, who rely heavily on RiskMetrics’s recommendations, virtually
always give directions on how to vote in director elections.60 When
considered in light of the “lost votes” resulting from changes to NYSE
Rule 452 in broker discretionary voting, it is clear that RiskMetrics, by
advising institutional investors, may determine the outcome of many
director elections.
In drafting the text of new Rule 14a-11, the SEC made clear that it
fails to appreciate the influence of RiskMetrics. Subparagraph (a)(1) states
that the rule’s provisions enabling shareholder nominations are available
only if “the registrant’s governing documents do not prohibit the
registrant’s shareholders from nominating a candidate or candidates for
election as a director.”61 This “power” given to the board to amend the
charter to prevent the application of 14a-11 is worthless. Given that
55

Marc Goldstein, Mitigating Dysfunctional Deference Through Improvements in
Board Composition and Board Effectiveness, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 490, 491
(2009), www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/lawreview/Colloquy/2009/21.
56
Porter, supra note 27, at 666.
57
Illig, supra note 40, at 261.
58
See Porter, supra note 27, at 667 (“[F]or many corporations, it is common wisdom
that a majority of their institutional shareholders will follow the advisor’s
recommendations slavishly, and so the outcome of the shareholder proposal may well be
determined by what position RiskMetrics has taken on the matter.”).
59
See id. (“[RiskMetrics’] real role in many cases is absolute and determinative,
rather than merely advisory.”).
60
Id. at 669.
61
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,082 (Jun.
18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
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RiskMetrics advocates holding boards accountable through the elimination
of staggered boards, one can confidently assume that RiskMetrics would
take a similar stance with regard to a charter amendment that displaces the
provisions of 14a-11.62 Because institutional investors follow advice
received from RiskMetrics,63 institutional investors are likely to be able to
rip such a limiting provision from a corporate charter as fast as the
directors can place it there.64 The SEC has thus proven itself incapable of
understanding the powerful influence of proxy advisory services.
The prospect of RiskMetrics determining the outcome of director
elections is troubling for long-term shareholder value when one realizes
that much of what RiskMetrics advises may not be in the best interests of
the long-term health of a company.65 However, a final adoption of the
SEC’s proposed rule changes will only enhance the influence of
RiskMetrics and other proxy advisory firms as institutional investors will
have greater access to the company’s proxy materials.
3. The Phenomenon of “Borrowed Shares”
Henry T. C. Hu and Bernard Black published an article describing the
practice of, and problems arising from, borrowing shares in a
corporation.66 An individual “borrows” shares by finding a shareholder
willing to “lend” the shares.67 The transaction results in the “borrower”
acquiring the voting rights connected to the shares, while the lender retains
the economic interest in the corporation whose stock has been borrowed.68
Perhaps unsurprisingly, share borrowing is practiced to a large degree by
hedge funds.69 This “decoupling” of voting rights from economic interests
presents problems for the outcome of director elections. A hedge fund
nominating a slate of directors for election may borrow shares on or
shortly before the record date, “reverse the transaction” afterwards, and
62

See RiskMetrics Group U.S. Policy, http://www.riskmetrics.com/policy_exchange/
policy_detail?param1=rmgus&param2=board&param3=annual (last visited Nov. 16,
2010) (RiskMetrics promotes voting for proposals to repeal staggered or classified
boards).
63
Porter, supra note 27, at 667.
64
See Bratton, supra note 44, at 11 (noting that hedge funds exercise their power to
exact governance concessions).
65
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
66
See Bernard Black & Henry T. C. Hu, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 811-12 (2006) (abstract).
67
Id. at 816.
68
Id. at 818.
69
Id. at 819.
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wield greater voting power in the election.70 Aside from the outward
unfairness of the arrangement, this practice undermines the traditional
fabric of corporate law wherein voting power is “proportional to economic
ownership.”71
It is worth noting that proposed Rule 14a-11 does include a provision
that could prevent some abuses by hedge funds that borrow shares. In
order for a shareholder to avail itself of 14a-11, the shareholder must have
beneficially owned a percentage of outstanding shares for at least one
year.72 Although this one-year provision would reduce the utility of
borrowing shares by disallowing a nomination by an opportunistic
shareholder that increases its holdings to the specified amount on or
shortly before the record date, it would not extinguish the utility entirely.
Because the one-year requirement applies only to the nominating
shareholder,73 nothing prevents like-minded institutional investors from
borrowing shares to vote in favor of the dissident slate. Similarly, a hedge
fund that already satisfies the threshold ownership percentage required to
nominate a director could conceivably still borrow shares to wield greater
voting power.
Moreover, hedge funds need not actually engage in share borrowing to
effect change, as the mere threat of doing so would produce an in terrorem
effect on incumbent boards to accede to hedge fund demands.74 When one
considers that the aim of hedge funds can conflict with sound long-term
corporate decision-making,75 the risks posed by share borrowing are
brought to light.
III. A PERFECT STORM FOR SHAREHOLDER POWER
Having laid the foundation for analyzing the current landscape of
corporate governance and share ownership, it is now possible to
understand why the final adoption of proposed SEC Rules 14a-11 and
14a-8 is unwise. To revisit the issue, director accountability in the wake of
the recent financial crisis has been given as the justification for proxy
reform.76 As one member of the pro-shareholder camp puts it,
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the most effective way to ensure that directors remain focused on
shareholder value—and do not become overly deferential to
management—is to establish a credible means for voting them out
of office. For this reason, majority voting for directors,
declassification of boards, and “proxy access” … are shaping up as
key issues for investors and regulators alike as they seek ways to
enhance accountability and to prevent a reoccurrence of the
77
financial market meltdown.

This statement, notably made by Marc Goldstein, an officer of
RiskMetrics,78 touches upon many of the aforementioned topics. It does so
by claiming that the listed provisions are necessary to enhance
accountability and shareholder value.79 This claim is mistaken. What
Goldstein and others point to as the solution to a problem is better
understood as the inner-workings of a corporate governance machination
that threatens long-term corporate health, and by extension, shareholder
value.
The topics discussed in Part II are surprisingly intertwined and
combine like pieces of a puzzle to create a picture in which shareholder
power is rising. The adoption of proposed SEC Rules 14a-8 and 14a-11
could be the final piece to the puzzle80 in which shareholders achieve
power at the expense of long-term corporate health and shareholder value.
The interconnection of the factors discussed can be explained as
follows: hedge funds, with the guidance of proxy advisory firms,81 can
shape corporate decision making from their activist stance,82 and affect
director elections by borrowing shares.83 Their power to affect director
elections is increased by the widespread adoption of majority voting84 and
the amendment to NYSE Rule 452.85 This power will increase with the
final adoption of SEC proposed Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8.86 It is thus
inescapable that when the SEC states its desire to empower shareholders
77
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by way of the proposed rules, it is in reality empowering institutional
shareholders, particularly hedge funds. The result is a situation in which
real pressure is placed on incumbent directors who wish to be re-elected.
When the discussed factors are considered together, two conclusions
are reached: (1) shareholders currently enjoy sufficient power, such that
proxy reform is unnecessary; and (2) the increased pressure to be felt by
directors will lead them, and the management they oversee, to “manage to
the market” at the expense of long-term corporate health and shareholder
value.87
A. Further Reform in the Interests of Shareholders is Unnecessary
With the adoption of amended NYSE Rule 452, incumbent directors
are sure to lose a number of votes in future elections.88 Meanwhile,
institutional investors will continue to vote.89 When considered alongside
the adoption of majority voting, institutional investors already have a real
opportunity to affect the outcome of director elections.90 This is so
because hedge funds have the ability to defeat an incumbent director by
way of a “withhold-the-vote” campaign.91 By embarking upon a
“withhold-the-vote” campaign at a company that has adopted majority
voting,92 and at the present time when brokers can no longer vote without
instructions from the beneficial owners,93 the ability for an institutional
investor or other shareholder to ensure that an incumbent director does not
receive a majority of votes is very real. Thus, the present mix of factors
impacting director elections is sufficient for shareholders to hold directors
accountable, such that adoption of the proposed SEC rules is unnecessary.
Indeed, even the starry-eyed shareholder proponent Professor Bebchuk
acknowledges that actual proxy contests, which would be enabled by the
proposed SEC rules, are unnecessary for shareholders to hold directors
accountable.94 Instead, the power for shareholders to intervene, he argues,
ensures that directors consider shareholder interests.95 Because
shareholders already wield the power to intervene, as described above,
87
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proxy access is unnecessary to produce the wishes of even its loudest
proponents.
B. Harm Caused by Managing to the Market
As noted above, a debate rages concerning whether pressure on
directors is beneficial from an accountability standpoint or detrimental
from a shortsightedness standpoint.96 However, a close examination of the
threat that increased shareholder power poses to long-term corporate
health and shareholder value makes clear that the pendulum has swung too
far, and proxy reform in the form of the current proposed SEC rules will
exacerbate the problem.
When pondering the current corporate governance landscape and the
proposed SEC rules, one is confronted with the question of whether
increased shareholder power is beneficial. However, it is important to first
ask who it is that will be empowered. The answer is hedge funds. Hedge
funds are the party to benefit most directly because it is they who engage
in active corporate monitoring.97 As a result, it is imperative to examine
whether empowering hedge funds is beneficial to shareholders generally.
Empowering hedge funds will not benefit shareholders generally
because their interests are misaligned. As Kahan and Rock note, “hedge
funds are set up to make money for their investors without regard to
whether the strategies they follow benefit shareholders generally.”98 To
note the misalignment of interests between hedge funds and shareholders
generally, consider that “institutional investors flip shares with more
frequency than retail investors.”99 The divergence of interests is aptly
pointed out by Lisa Fairfax, who notes, “granting all shareholders access
to the proxy statement could increase the influence of shareholders with
narrow or special interests in a manner that could have negative
repercussions for … shareholders as a whole.”100
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Therefore, situations may exist in which long-term retail investors are
harmed because hedge funds “seek to push the corporation into steps
designed to create a short-term pop in the company’s share price so that
they can turn a quick profit.”101 Such a situation would be detrimental to
shareholders generally if the move advocated by the hedge fund created an
initial surge in share price, but turned out to be a poor investment for the
company, lowering share price in the long term.
Having thus explored what effect empowering hedge funds will have
on other shareholders, it is also important to examine what effect increased
shareholder access will have on corporations. The principal objection to
shareholder access is that its adoption will increase pressure on boards of
directors in a manner that is harmful to long-term corporate health.102 The
reason for this concern is that the louder the voice of hedge funds, the
more sensitive boards are to their demands.103 As previously discussed,
hedge funds may seek near-term increases in share price.104 Thus when
boards are compelled, as a result of shareholder access, to listen to the
funds, they become short-termist themselves. A former practitioner voiced
this concern by pointing out that putting “an undue focus on short-term
strategies will usually result in poor strategies and outcome [sic] for the
long-term.”105 He likewise recognizes that this very well could result from
increased pressure on directors, stating that “if the directors perceive there
to be a significant risk that the director can’t count on re-election, the
director’s current long-term outlook may well switch to ‘how do I get reelected next year?’”106 With adoption of the proposed SEC rules, this
result is all the more likely, as “the risk that the director can’t count on reelection” will surely be magnified in a given year.
The result is that boards of directors and the management they oversee
may “manage to the market.”107 Professor Wachter explains why this is a
problem; “[s]hareholder empowerment will make it much more difficult
for a good board of directors to resist pressures to manage to the market.
This can lead to bad business decisions, either due to information
101
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asymmetry or a run of speculative mispricing.”108 Further, complications
for corporate investment policy “arise when managers manage to the
market, factoring expected stock price[s] … into their decisions …. [T]he
risk of underpricing [sic] may lead management to pass up [a good]
opportunity.”109
To illustrate the problem, Wachter offers the recent financial crisis as
an example. Countrywide Financial, who wrote risky mortgages in the
subprime sector during the mid 2000s saw its share price soar, while
JPMorgan, who never entered the industry to any great extent, witnessed a
lagging stock price.110 It is not difficult to imagine a hedge fund holding a
significant stake in a bank pressuring the bank’s board of directors to enter
the subprime-lending sector in order to enjoy share price gains comparable
to those seen at competing banks. The message is clear: if increased
shareholder access equates to corporations managing to the market,
extremely unwise business decisions may follow. This suggests that the
“solution” may be a different way of arriving at the same problem. It is
ironic indeed that the recent financial crisis is offered as an impetus for
shareholder access when proxy reform presents the danger of leading to
the very same result.
The foregoing illustrates that increasing shareholder power, which is to
say hedge fund power, may lead to directors managing to the market.111
Reuniting control with ownership may thus lead directors to ignore the
informational advantages they enjoy over shareholders because they can
be forced, whether by proxy contest or “the power to intervene,”112 to
acquiesce to hedge fund demands. In other words, the message may be
that “the directors should ignore their own business judgment.”113 Given
108
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these considerations, the SEC should be hesitant to alter the current
balance of power, as “[t]he prevailing legal model works differently
because it instructs the directors to maximize the value of the
‘corporation’ and not the stock price.”114 This danger, presented by
maximizing the share price in place of the value of the corporation, should
not be taken lightly.
CONCLUSION
The SEC has responded to the recent financial crisis by proposing rule
changes designed to hold directors accountable and increase shareholder
value. In proposing these changes, the SEC has proven itself ignorant of
the current mix of factors affecting director elections and corporate
performance. Because the current landscape provides sufficient
opportunities for shareholders to hold boards accountable, proxy reform is
an unnecessary evil that threatens long-term shareholder value.

114

Id.; see also Olson, supra note 96, at 303-04 (“[The current SEC proposals] create
a substantial risk that boards of directors and CEOs will no longer see themselves as
primarily responsible for the direction and success of the enterprise, but rather as mere
agents implementing shareholder decisions.”).

